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Competition of Gas Pipeline Projects1 
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Communicated by F. L. Chernousko 
Abstract. The paper addresses the issue of the optimal investments in 
innovations with strong long-term aftereffects. As an example, invest-
ments in the construction of gas pipelines are considered. The most sen-
sitive part of an investment project is the choice of the commercialization 
time (stopping time), i.e., the time of finalizing the construction of the 
pipeline. If several projects compete on the market, the choices of the 
commercialization times determine the future structure of the market 
and thus become especially important. Rational decisions in this respect 
can be associated with Nash equilibria in a game between the projects. In 
this game, the total benefits gained during the pipelines life periods act 
as payoffs and the commercialization times as strategies. The goal of this 
paper is to characterize multiequilibria in the game of timing. The case of 
two players is studied in detail. A key point in the analysis is the obser-
vation that, for all players, the best response commercialization times 
concentrate at two instants that are fixed in advance. This reduc.es deci-
sionmaking to choosing between two fixed investment policies (fast and 
slow) with the prescribed commercialization times. A description of a 
simple algorithm that finds all the Nash equilibria composed of fast and 
slow scenarios concludes the paper. 
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equilibria, best reply curves, econometric estimation. 
1The second author was partially supported by the Russian Fund for Fundamental Research, 
Grant 03-01-00737. The third author was partially supported by the Russian Fund for 
Fundamental Research, Grant 02-01-00769, and by the Program for the Sponsorship of 
Leading Scientific Schools, Grant 00-15-96057. 
2 Resera~h Scholar, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
3 Professor, Stek.lov Mathematical Institute, Moscow, Russia; Coordinator of the Dynamic 
Systems Project, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
4 Leading Researcher, Institute of Mathematics and Mechanics, Ekaterinburg, Russia; Research 
Scholar, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
147 
1)022·3139/04/0100-0147 /0 © 2004 Plenum Publ ishing Corporation 
148 JOTA: VOL. 120, NO. I, JANUARY 2004 
l. Introduction 
When several large-scale gas pipeline projects compete for a new gas 
market, the choices of the commercialization times (stopping times), i.e., the 
times of finalizing the construction of the pipelines, detennine the future 
structure of Lhe market and thus become especially important. In Ref. 1, 
which motivated the present study, a detailed pipeline model based on clas-
sical patterns of mathematical economics (see Refs. 2·--3) was designed and 
a best reply dynamic adaptation algorithm originating from the theory of 
evolutionary games (see Refs. 4-9) was used to estimate numerically the 
commercialization times for the pipeline projects competing nowadays for 
the Turkey gas market. 
Rational choices of the commercialization times can be viewed as Nash 
equilibria in a game between the projects. In the present paper, we study the 
structure of this game. In order to make the model easily tractable in tenns of 
game theory (see Refs . 10---11), we introduce several simplifying assumptions; 
in particular, we reduce the number of competing projects to two. A back-
ground in the analysis of gas infrastructures (see Ref. 12) and problems of 
optimal timing (see Refs. 13-14) is employed. 
The model takes into account the stages of construction and exploita-
tion of the gas pipelines. In each level, the model is optimized and estimated 
using appropriate techniques of the theory of optimal control and theory of 
differential games (see Refs. 15-17). At the stage of exploitation, as gas 
supply policies compete on the market, decisionmaking is relatively clear: the 
competitors search for an equilibrium supply at any instant. Therefore, we 
focus on the stage of construction, at which investment policies compete 
and decisionmaking is concerned with strong long-term aftereffects. The 
competitors interact through choosing their commercialization times. A 
proper individual choice is the best response to the choices of the other 
competitor. Therefore, a pair of commercialization times is suitable to every 
competitor if and only if the commercialization time of every competitor 
responds best to the commercialization time of the other competitor. Such 
situations constitute Nash equilibria in the game under consideration. In this 
game, the total benefits gained during the pipelines life periods act as payoffs 
and the commercialization times act as strategies. Our goal is to characterize 
Lhe equilibria in this game, which will be referred to further as game of 
timing. 
In Section 2, we describe the general two-player game of timing, in 
which the cost and benefit functions determining the players payoffa are not 
specified. Jn Section 3, we find the Nash equilibria in the game. A key point 
in the analysis is the observation that, for all players, the best response com-
mercialization times concentrate at two instants that are fixed in advance. 
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This reduces decisionmaking to choosing between two fixed investment 
policies (fast and slow) with the prescribed commercialization times. 
In Section 4, we describe an algorithm that finds all the Nash equilibria 
in the game of timing. In Section 5, we study the game of timing for the 
model of operation of gas pipelines which was described in Ref. 1. 
In Section 6, we give results of the model-based analysis for two case 
studies: competing gas pipeline projects in the Caspian region and planned 
pipeline routes to the gas market in China. Finally, Section 7 contains the 
proofs of the propositions formulated in Section 4. 
2. Game of Timing 
In this section, we construct a game-theoretic model of competition of 
two gas pipeline projects. We call it the game of timing. The pipelines are 
expected to operate at the same market. We associate players 1 and 2 with 
the investors/managers of projects 1 and 2, respectively. Assuming that the 
starting time for making investments is t = 0, we consider virtual positive 
commercialization times ! 1 and t 2 of projects 1and2 (i.e., the final times of the 
construction of the pipelines). Given a (virtual) commercialization time !;, 
player i, i = 1, 2, can estimate the cost C; (t;) for finalizing project i at time 
t;. The positive-valued cost functions C;(t;), i = 1, 2, are defined on the posi-
tive half axis. The following assumption will simplify our analysis. 
Assumption 2.1. For each player i, the cost function C;(t;) is smooth 
(continuously differentiable), monotonically decreasing, and convex. 
A formal interpretation of Assumption 2.1 is that the derivative 
Cf (l;) = dC; (t;)/ dt; is negative and increasing. A substantial interpretation 
is that the cost of the project falls down as the project commercialization 
period is prolonged; moreover, the longer is the commercialization period, 
the less sensitive, with respect to its prolongations, is the rate of cost reduc-
tion. In what follows, the rate of cost reduction for player i is understood as 
the positive-valued monotonically decreasing function 
a;(t;) = ·- C((t;) . (I) 
Let us argue for player I as the manager of pipeline 1. At any time t > 0, 
the price of gas and costs for extraction and transportation of gas determine 
the benefit rate b 1(t) of player l (note that this benefit rate is virtual, because 
t may precede the actual commercialization time of project I). The costs for 
extraction and transportation of gas do not depend on the state of project 2, 
whereas the price of gas depends on the presence (absence) of player 2 on the 
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marketplace. In the situation where both players operate on the market, the 
price of gas should obviously be smaller compared to the situation where 
player 1 occupies the market solely. Hence, the benefit rate b1(t) may take 
two values, b11 (t) and hdt), with 
b1 J (t) > b12(t). (2) 
We call b 11 (t) the upper benefit rate and bn(t) the lower benefit rate of 
player 1 at time t. At time t (which virtually follows the commercialization 
time of player 1), player 1 virtually gets b 11 (t), if player 2 does not operate on 
the market, and gets b!2(t), if player 2 operates on the market. Similarly, we 
introduce the upper and lower benefit rates of player 2 at time t, b21 (t) and 
b22(t), with 
b11 (t) > h22(t) . (3) 
A time t, player 2 gets b21 (t) , if player 1 does not operate on the market, and 
gets h22(t), otherwise. We assume that the positive-valued upper and lower 
benefit rates bi! (t) and bn(t), i = I, 2, are continuous functions defined on the 
positive half axis. We introduce also the following assumption . 
Assumption 2.2. For every player i, i= 1, 2, the graph of the rate of 
cost reduction a;(t) intersects the graph of the upper benefit rate bil(t) from 
above at a unique point t;' > 0 and stays below it afterward; similarly, the 
graph of a;(t) intersects the graph of b;z(t) from above at a unique point 
1; > 0 and stays below it afterward; more accurately, 
a1(t) > b11 (t) for O<t < r; , a1(rj )=bn(tj), a;(t)<bil(t) for t>r; , (4) 
a1(t) > b;2(t) forO<t < t7, a1(t7)=b;2(t7}, a;(t) <b12(t) fort>t7. (5) 
Remark 2.1. Assumption 2.2 implies in particular that, if t > 0 is suf-
ficiently small, the rate of cost reduction a1(t) is greater than the upper ben-
efit rate bn (t); if t > 0 is sufficiently large, the rate of cost reduction a; (t) is 
smaller than the lower benefit rate ba(t). 
Remark 2.2. Since a;(t) is decreasing and b;1(t) >b;z(l) [see (2) and 
(3)], we have 
(6) 
The graph of the rate of cost reduction a; (t) and the graphs of the upper 
and lower benefit rates bn(t) and b;z(t) are shown schematically in Fig. I. 
The fact that t2 is the commercialization time of player 2 implies that 
player 2 does not operate on the market at any time t < t2 and operates on 
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Fig. I. Rate of cost reduction a;(I) and upper and lower benefit rates bil(I) and b,-i(t). 
the market at every time t?- t2. Accordingly, the benefit rate b 1(t) of player 
1 equals b 11 (t) for t<t2 and equals bdt) for t?-t2. We stress the dependence 
of b1(t) on t2 and write b1Ult 2) instead of b1(t) . Thus, given a commercializ-
ation time t2 of project 2, the benefit rate of player 1 is found as 
if t<t2, 
ift2=!2 . (7) 
Similarly, a commercialization time t 1 of project 1 determines the benefit rate 
of player 2 as 
{
b21(l), 
b2(tlt1) = bn(t) , 
if t< ti, 
if t ?.: t l . 
The graphs of the benefit rates b1(t lt2) and b2(tit 1) are shown schemati-
cally in Fig. 2. 
Given a commercialization time t 1 of player 1, and a commercialization 
time t 2 of player 2, the total benefits of players 1 and 2 are represented by the 
integrals 
B1(t1, t2) = f "°bi(tlt2)dt, (8) 
,, 
B2(t1, tJ = j' "'0b2(t lt 1)dt, 
1, 
(9) 
respectively. 
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Fig. 2. (a) Benefit rate of player I . (b) Benefit rate of player 2. 
We make the following natural assumption. 
Assumption 2.3. For every positive time t1 and every positive time t2, 
the integrals B1(ti, t2) and B2(ti, t2) are finite. 
Remark 2.3. Assumption 2.3 is equivalent to the following: for every 
positive time t1 and every positive time t 2, the integrals J;:"bn(t)dt, 
J~' b22(t)dt are finite . 
Given a commercialization time t 1 of player I and a commercialization 
time t2 of player 2, the total profit of player i is defined as 
P;(t 1, t2) = ···· C;(t;) + B;(t1, t2). (10) 
We are ready to define the game of timing for players 1and2 in line with 
the standards of game theory (see Ref. I I) . In the game of timing, the strat-
egies of player i, i = l, 2, are the positive (virtual) commercialization times t;, 
for project i; the payoff to player i, thanks to the strategies t 1 and t2 of players 
I and 2, respectively, is the total profit P;(ti, t2). 
3. Nash Equilibria 
According to the standard terminology of game theory, a strategy rt of 
player I is said to be a best response of player 1 to a strategy t2 of player 2 
if rr- maximizes the payoff P1(ti. t2) to player 1 over the set of all strategies t 1 
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of player 1, 
P1 (tf, t2) = m~0x P1 (t1, t2) . /1/ 
Similarly, a strategy c; of player 2 is said to be a best response of player 2 to 
a strategy t 1 of player 1 if r; maximizes the payoff P2(ti, t2) to player 2 over 
the set of all strategies t2 of player 2, 
P2Ct1 , t;) = ma0x P2Ct1, t2). 12> 
Any pair (tt, 1;), where tt is a strategy of player 1 and t; a strategy of 
player 2, is said to be a Nash equilibrium in the game of timing if rt is a best 
response of player 1 to i; and r; is a best response of player 2 to it- Our goal 
is to characterize the Nash equilibria in the game of timing. 
We start with a simple observation concerned with the dependence of 
the player payoff on the strategy of the other player. For example, let us 
consider the payoff Pi(t1, t2) to player 1. The differentiation of Pi(ti, t2 ) with 
respect to ti yields 
JP, Cti , t2) / J1i =a, (t, ) - bi (lilt2) 
if ti < !2, 
ifti>t2 . (11) 
Here, we have used (10), (1), (8), and (7) . Note that the above partial deriv-
ative exists and is continuous at any t 1 > 0 except for ti = t 2. Geometrically, 
(11) means that P 1(t 1, t2) grows in t 1 on the time intervals where the graph of 
a 1(ti) lies above the graph of b1(tilt2) an declines in 11 on the time intervals 
where the graph of a 1(t 1) lies below the graph of b1(1ilt2) . 
Let us take two arbitrary strategics of player 2, t21 and t22 > 12i. As (11) 
shows, 
for t1 < t2i and ti > !22, and 
for 121 < ti <t22. Recall that 
b11(ti) --- b12Cti) > 0; 
see (2). We have stated that, beyond the time interval located between t 2 i and 
t22 , Pi(t 1, t22) and Pi(ti, 12 i) have the same rate in t 1 and, that within this time 
interval, P1(t 1, tn) declines in t1 faster than Pi(t 1, t2 i). Thanks to (8) and (7), 
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Therefore, 
P 1(t1>t22 )>P1(ti,t 21 ), for 11 <t22. 
Let us sum up the previous arguments in the following statement. 
Proposition 3.1. For every t 1 >O, the payoff P1(ti, t 2) to player 1 in-
creases in t2; moreover, given a t 21 >0 and a t22>t21 , one has P 1(ti,t22)= 
P1(t1 , t21) for t 1 2:: t22 and P1(ti, !22) > P1(t1. t21) for t1 < t22. 
The graphs of P1(li, t2) for t2 = t21 and t2 = t22 > t21 are shown in Fig. 3. 
A symmetric argument leads to a similar observation for player 2. 
Proposition 3.2. For every t2 >O, the payoff P2(t 1, t2) to player 2 in-
creases in t1; moreover, given a t 11 >O and a t12>t 1i. one has P2(t 12, t2)= 
P2(t11, t2) for t2 2:: t12 and P2(t12, t2) > P2(t1 i. t2) for t2 < !12· 
Remark 3.1. The fact stated in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 is intuitively 
clear: for the investor/manager of a gas pipeline project, any prolongation 
of the commercialization period of the competing project is profitable. 
Now, let us find the best responses (the best reply curve) of player I to a 
given strategy t2 of player 2. 
It is easy enough to identify lhe intervals of growth and decline of the 
payoff P1(t 1, t2) as a function of 11• We use (11) and refer to the points(] and 
((,at which the graph of a1 (t) intersects the graphs of b 11 (t) and bn(t) ; see (4), 
(5), and Fig. 2. 
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Assume first that t2 ::::JI; recall that fl<tt [see (6)]. Then, as (4), (5), and 
Fig. 2 show, the graph of a 1(ti) lies above the graph of b1(ti!t2) fort 1 <ti and 
lies below it for t 1 > t7; at t 1 = t7, the graphs intersect. Figure 4(a) illustrates 
the relations between the graphs. 
Due to (11), oP1(ti, t2)/ot1 is positive for t 1 < t7, t 1 -:tt2 , and negative for 
t 1 > tt, Therefore, t1 = t'j' is the unique maximizer of P 1(ti, t2) in the set of all 
positive t 1; in other words, t7 is the single best response of player I to strategy 
t2 of player 2. 
Let us assume that t2 ?:: t7. Then, (4), (5), and Fig. 2 show that the graph 
of a1(t 1) lies above the graph of b1(tilt2) for t 1 <fl, and lies below it for t 1 >ti; 
at t 1 = t7, the graphs intersect. Figure 4(b) illustrates the relations between 
the graphs. Due to (11), oP1(ti. t 2)/ot 1 is positive for t 1 < r1· and negative for 
t1 > (), t1 -:tt2• Hence, t 1 = t"I is the unique maximizer of P1(t 1, t2) in the set of 
all positive t 1; i.e., ti is the single best response of player 1 to t2• 
Now, let t2 lie in the interval [ti, t-rJ. Then, (4), (5), and Fig. 2 show that 
the graph of a 1(ti) lies above the graph of h1(tilt 2) for t1 < tj, lies below it for 
ti< t 1 < t2, lies again above the graph of b1 (ti!t2) for t2 < t1 < t7, and lies again 
below it for t 1 >tr Figure 4(c) illustrates the relations between the graphs. 
Thanks to (1 I), we conclude that P 1(t 1, t2), as a function of t 1, strictly de-
creases on the interval (0, tj), strictly decreases on the interval (ti·, t2), strictly 
increases on the interval (t2, t7), and strictly decreases on the interval ur' co). 
Therefore, the maximizers of P1 (ti, t2) in the set of all positive ti, i.e., the best 
responses of player 1 to t2, are restricted to the two-element set {ti, ir }. 
Let us identify the actual maximizers in this set. We refer to Proposition 
3.1. Suppose that t2 <t7. Set t1 =t;,t21 =t1, and t22 =t7. We see that 
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ti= t22 >t21 . By Proposition 3.1, 
Pi(t1, tn) = Pi(ti, t2d 
or 
(12) 
Since P1(tt, i 2) is continuous in i 2, (12) holds for i 2 = t!' as well. Now, we take 
arbitrary i 2 i and t22 > t2i in the interval [tj', t7]. By Proposition 3.1, 
Pi (ri, 122)> P1(tj,121 ). 
Therefore, P 1(f1, t 2) strictly increases in t 2 on [t7, t;J. Consider the function 
p(t2) = P1(rj, i1)-P1(tt, t2), 
defined on [rj', t;}. By (12), we have 
p(l2) =Pi (fj, t2)- Pi CtT, in, 
(13) 
for all i 2 in the interval [t7, in, As long as P1(t'j', t2) strictly increases in i 2 on 
[fl. 17J, p(t2) strictly increases on [i7, 1;] . Earlier, we have stated that t7 is the 
single best response of player 1 to any i 2 :5 fl; in particular, this holds for 
t2 = fj, i.e., 
Hence, 
p(lt) = pl (fj' fj) - pi UT' fj) < 0. 
Earlier, we have stated that (j' is the single best response of player 1 to any 
i 2 ?::: t7; in particular, this holds for t2 = t7, i.e., 
P1(rj, tT» P,(t7, tT). 
Hence, 
p(in = P,(tj, iT) - PiUT. iT)>o. 
We have found that p(t2) takes a negative value at the left endpoint of the 
interval [tj, i7] and a positive value at the right endpoint of this interval. 
Since p(t1) is continuous, there exists a f2 in the interior of [fl, t;], for which 
p(i2) = 0. The fact that p(t2) strictly increases on (ti, l!J implies that the point 
t2 is unique; i.e., p(t2) < 0 for ti =.s t2 < i2 and p(t2) > 0 for f!?::: t2 > t"z. By the 
definition of p(t i 2) and (13), we have 
P1(t!, f2)=P,(IT , f2), 
Pi (rj, lz) <Pi (t;. lz), 
Pi (tj, t2) <Pi (tT, t2), 
for fj:5t2< i2. 
for tT?. t1 > iz. 
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Earlier, we have stated that all the best responses of player 1 to t2 lie in 
the two-element set {ti, ti}. Therefore, we conclude that, if t2 = i~, player 1 
has tv.:o best responses, ti and t'!, to t2; if ti~ t2 < i2, the unique best response 
of player I to t2 is t7; and if t7 ::=::: t2 >ti, the unique best response of player 1 to 
t2 is tj. Recall that the best response of player 1 to t2 is t7 if t2 <ti, and fi 
ift2>t7. 
We summarize the above considerations as follows. 
Proposition 3.3. ln the interval ((j, tt), there exists a unique point i2 
such that 
(14) 
The set of all best responses of player 1 to i2 is { (j, tf}. If 0 < t2 < i2, then the 
unique best response of player 1 to t 2 is tf. If t2 > i2 , then the unique best 
response of player 1 to t2 is ti. 
We call ti the fast choice of player I and tt the slow choice of player 1. 
Proposition 3.3 claims that the slow choice of player l is the best response of 
player l to all fast strategies t 2 of player 2, namely, those satisfying t2 < t",_, and 
the fast choice of player 1 is the best response of player l to all slow strategies t2 
of player 2, namely, those satisfying t2 > i2; finally, both fast and slow choices 
of player l respond best to t 2 = i2 . We call i2 the switch point for player 1. 
Let us consider the function that associates to each strategy t 2 of player 
2 the set of all best responses of player 1 to t2 ; we call it the best response 
function of player I. The graph of the best response function of player I is 
shown in Fig. 5(a). It consists of the horizontal segment located strictly 
above the segment (0, [2] on the traxis at the level tf, and the unbounded 
horizontal segment located strictly above the segment [i2, oo) on the ti-axis at 
the level ti. The points (tt, i2) and (ti, 0_) lie on the graph. 
A symmetric argument leads to a similar characterization of the best 
responses of player 1. 
Proposition 3.4. In the interval (t2, t~), there exists a unique point f 1 
such that 
(15) 
The set of all best responses of player 2 to i 1 is { t2, t~}. If 0<t 1 < i 1, then the 
unique best response of player 2 to t 1 is t; . lf t 1 > 11, then the unique best 
response of player 2 to t 1 is lz. 
We call t2 the fast choice of player 2, rr the slow choice of player 2, and 
12 the switch point for player 2. We introduce also the best response function 
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Fig. 5. (a) Best response function of player I. (b) Best response function of player 2. 
of player 2, which associates to each strategy t 1 of player 1 the set of all best 
responses of player 2 to t 1. The graph of the best response function of player 
2 is shown in Fig. 5(b). Here, the independent variable t 1 is shown on the 
vertical axis and the best responses of player 2 are located on the horizontal 
axis. The graph of the best response function of player 2 consists of the 
vertical segment located to the right of the segment (0, ii] on the t 1-axis at 
the distance 1r, and the unbounded vertical segment located to the right of 
the segment [ii, w) on the t 1-axis at the distance (].. The points Ci1> ti) and 
Ci1, t2) lie on the graph. 
Now, we recall the definition of a Nash equilibrium and find easily that 
a strategy pair (tt, t;) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the point Ut, t;) 
belongs to the intersection of the graphs of the best response functions of 
players 1 and 2. Figure 5 shows that the graphs necessarily intersect. Figure 6 
gives an example of the intersection. 
For each intersection point [i.e., each Nash equilibrium (r7, c;)J, point r7 
is the fast or slow choice of player 1, and point 1; is the fast or slow choice 
of player 2. In case c7 is the fast choice of player 1 and r; the slow choice of 
player 2, we call (r7, r;), the fast-slow Nash equilibrium; similarly, we define 
the slow-fast, fast-fast, and slow-slow Nash equilibria. 
Nash equilibria of different types arise under different relations between 
the players fast and slow choices and the switch points of their rivals. The list 
of all admissible cases is as follows: 
i2 '2: c;, 
f2'2:.t;, 
(16) 
(17) 
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Fig. 6. Intersection of the graphs of best response functions of players I and 2. 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
An elementary analysis in the spirit of Fig. 6 leads to the full classifica-
tion of the Nash equilibria in the game of timing. 
Proposition 3.5. In cases (16), (17), and (21), the unique Nash equili-
brium is slow-fast((!, tr); see Fig. 7(a), (b), (c). In cases (18), (22), and (23), 
the unique Nash equilibrium is fast-slow (t7, t2); see Fig. 7(d), (e), (f). In 
cases (19) and (20), the game of timing has precisely two Nash equilibria, 
fast-slow (ti-, rr) and slow-fast (ti, t2); see Fig. 7(g). 
Remark 3.2. Proposition 3.1 shows that the game of timing admits 
only fast-slow and slow-fast equilibria. 
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I 
I 
(a) (b) (c) 
>---
-
(d) (e) (f) 
I 
I 
(g) 
Fig. 7. (a) One equilibrium, slow-fast. (b) One equilibrium, slow-fast. (c) One equilibrium, 
slow-fast. (d) One equilibrium, fast-slow. (e) One-equilibrium, fast-slow. (f) One equi-
librium, fast-slow. (g) Two equilibria, fast-slow and slow-fast. 
Let us consider in more detail the most interesting situation where the 
game of timing has two Nash equilibria, fast-slow and slow-fast; i.e., (19) or 
(20) holds; see Fig. 7(g). By Proposition 3.1 and due to the inequalities 
ti< i2 :st!, we have 
P1(t], 1;)2=P1(t(, f2); 
moreover, the inequality is strict if and only if i2 <tr, Using equality (14), 
Proposition 3.1 and the inequalities t7 > i2 2': r2, we transform the right-hand 
side as follows: 
P1(/I, i2)= P1(t~, i2)=P1(t;,t;). 
Thus, for the fast-slow and slow-fast equilibria (ti-, 1n and ((i, t:2), we have 
Pi (r1, t~-) 2': P1 (t7, t;J. 
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!Vforeover, the inequality is strict if f 2 <tr_ If this is so, player I prefers the 
fast-slow equilibrium; otherwise, the fast-slow and slow-fast equilibria arc 
equivalent for this player. Similarly, we state that, if f1 < tt, player 2 prefers 
the slow-fast equilibrium; otherwise, the equilibria are equivalent for this 
player. Thus, generally, each player prefers his fast equilibrium. 
Let us give an exact formulation. 
Proposition 3.6. Let the game of timing have two Nash equilibria; 
i.e., let (19) or (20) hold. Then: 
(i) P1(tl, t~)?: P1(t7, t2); moreover, the inequality is strict if and only if 
i2<tl; 
(ii) P2(ti, 12)?: P2(t7, t2); moreover, the inequality is strict if and only if 
f 1 <rt. 
Remark 3.3. Let the game have two equilibria [i.e., (19) or (20) hold]. 
Assume that the fast-slow and slow-fast equilibria are equivalent to player 
1, i.e., 
Then, by Proposition 3.6(i), {2?:ti, As (19), (20) show, we actually have 
i2 = 1; , which is an exceptional situation for the case of two equilibria. 
Hence, 
By Proposition 3.6(ii), 
In other words, the slow-fast equilibrium is strictly preferable for player 2. 
In the symmetric case, where the fast-slow and slow-fast equilibria are equi-
valent to player 2, i.e., 
we find similarly that the fast-slow equilibrium is strictly preferable for 
player 1. Thus, in those exceptional cases where one of the players has no 
preference in choosing an equilibrium, the other player strictly prefers his 
fast equilibrium. 
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Remark 3.4. Let us assume that the parameters of projects I and 2 
are identical; i.e., 
C1 (t) = C2(t) and B1 (t, s) = Bl(s, t), for all positive t and s. 
Then, the game of timing takes a symmetric form. The players have the same 
fast and slow choices and switch times, 
Hence, (19) and (20) hold. By Proposition 3.5, the game of timing has the 
fast-slow and slow-fast equilibria. The inequality i2 <1; is equivalent to 
i2 < t'{, which holds trivially [see (6)). By Proposition 3.6, we conclude that 
Similarly, we find that 
Thus, in the symmetric game of timing, player 1 prefers the fast-slow equi-
librium and player 2 prefers the slow-fast equilibrium. Obviously, the situa-
tion does not change if the parameters of projects 1 and 2 are sufficiently 
close to each other. The question of a practical choice of an equilibrium in 
the case where the players have different preferences arises. Here, we do not 
argue on this; we note only that game theory does not provide any clear 
recommendations in this respect. 
4. Solution Algorithm 
For convenience, we represent the obtained classification of the Nash 
equilibria in table form (see Table 1). 
We conclude the general part of our study with the description of an 
algorithm that finds the Nash equilibria in the game of timing. The algorithm 
refers to the definitions of the players fast and slow choices r; and it , i = 1, 2, 
the players switch times i;, i = I, 2, and Table 1. 
Step I. Use definitions (4) and (5) for finding the players fast and slow 
choices i;-, and i;, i::: 1, 2. 
Step 2. Use definitions ( 14) and ( 15) for finding the players switch 
times f;, i = 1, 2. 
Step 3. Use Table 1 for identifying the Nash equilibria. 
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Table I. Classification of Nash equilibria in the game of 
timing (table form of Proposition 3.5). 
Number of 
Case equilibria 
i 1 < r] 
i1~ 12· 
fi<f1 <t7 
i2?:. ti 
ti<i1 <rT 
i2s: (-j 
I] < i1 :SI! 2 
(2$f2<ti 
I] :S i, < lj1 2 
r2<1i:s12 
i, :S li-
t2 < i2 < f~· 
i, ~:: 17 
t~<i2<ti 
i, 2:: 17 
iz<l2 
5. Gas Pipeline Game 
Types of 
equilibria Notation 
slow-fast u7, i:!l 
slow-fast (17,ri) 
fast-slow (/j, ri) 
fast-slow (I], 12) 
slow-fast (17 ,(i) 
fast -slow (I], 12) 
slow-fast (1!. 12) 
slow-fast (17,fi.) 
fast-slow (ri, ti) 
fast-slow (I], 12) 
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In this section, we apply the suggested solution method to a model 
described in Ref. I. Wishing to demonstrate a clear analytic result, we con-
sider a simplified version of lhe model. Namely, we eliminale the price of 
liquid natural gas, which acts as an upper bound for the price of gas in the 
original model; we do not introduce the upper bounds for the rates of supply 
or the pipelines capacities; we assume that the costs for extraction and 
transportation of gas are functions of time only; finally, we analyze the 
competition of two pipeline projects (as our theory prescribes). 
The model is as follows . The cost C;(t;) for finalizing the construction of 
pipeline i, i = I, 2, at time I; is defined to be the minimum of the integral 
investment 
I;(r;) = fr; e-41 r;(t)dt . 
• 0 
Here, A is a positive discount. The minimum is taken over all admissible 
open-loop investment strategics r;(t) of player i. An admissible open-loop 
investment strategy of player i (for a commercialization time !;) is modeled as 
an integrable control function , 
r ;(l) > 0, (24) 
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that brings the accumulated investment x;(t) from 0 to the prescribed com-
mercialization level .x; > 0 at time t1. Thus, for the initial and final values of 
the accumulated investment, we have 
X;(O) = 0, X;(l;) = X;. 
The dynamics of x;(t) is modeled as 
x;(t) = -ax;(t) + ri(t). 
(25) 
(26) 
Here, CT' is a positive obsolescence coefficient and r is a delay parameter, 
located strictly between 0 and 1. In the terminology of control theory (see 
Ref. 15), the cost C;(t;) is defined to be the optimal value in the problem of 
minimizing the performance index f;(r;) for the control system (26), (24), 
subject to the boundary constraints (25). 
The upper and lower benefit rates b;1(t) and bdt) for player i at time t > 0 
are found as equilibrium payoffs in the static supply game modeling the in-
stantaneous gas market. In the supply game arising at time t, the strategies y; of 
player i are nonnegative rates of supply and the payoff to player i is defined as 
(27) 
Here, y is the total rate of supply, ;r(t, y) is the price of gas, and c; (t) > 0 is the 
cost for extraction and transportation of gas for player i. The price of gas is 
modeled as 
;r(ylt) = (g(t)/y/i, 
where g(t) > 0 is the consumer GDP at time t and /3 is the inverse to the price 
elasticity of gas demand; we have 
0</3< 1. 
The total supply y equals y; if player i occupies the market solely and equals 
y 1 + .Y2 if both players operate on market. 
The next proposition gives the expressions for the costs C;(t;). rates of 
cost reduction a;(t;), and upper and lower benefit rates bn(t1) and bri(t;), 
i = 1, 2. We need the following assumption. 
Assumption 5.l. [t holds that 
I - (2 - /3)c;(t)/[c 1 (t) + c2(t)] > 0, i = l, 2. (28) 
Remark 5.1. Condition (28) implies that the costs c1(t) and c2(t) are 
relatively close to each other. Indeed, in the extremal case where c1(t) = 
c2(t) = c(t), (28) is equivalent to the trivial inequality f3 > 0. Another 
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interpretation of condition (28) is that f3 is close to 1. Indeed, in the limit-
ing case where f3 = 1, (28) is equivalent to the trivial inequality 
l - C;(t)/[c1(t) + c2(t)]>O. 
Proposition 5.1. For player i, i = 1, 2, the following formulas hold: 
(a) The cost C;(t;) is given by 
C;(t;) =pa -I --J.t; -a/ (1 - ··pt;)a - 1 e X; e . (29) 
where 
a= l/y, p =(a()+ A.) / (a -- 1). (30) 
(b) The rate of cost reduction a;(t;) is given by 
a;(l) =Pa - I -~f'e-J.1(..1. + ve-P')/(l - e-Pt)a' (31) 
where 
v = lX(). (32) 
(c) The upper benefit rate bn (t;) is given by 
bil(t) = e-J.1(1-[3)1 /{3 ·-lg(t) / c;1f3 - 1(t). (33) 
(d) If Assumption 5.1 holds, the lower benefit rate b;2 (t;) is given by 
b· (t)=e-·11(2-/3) 1/f3 · 1{1- <2 -fJ)c;(t) }
2
g(t)l[c (t)+c (ll] 1/ /II . 
'
2 
· · · [c ( l) + Co (t)] ' 1 2 · 
I . • (34) 
(e) Under Assumption 5.1, the following inequality is valid : 
bn (t) > b;2(t); 
see (2) and (3 ). 
(35) 
Jn what follows, we assume that c;(t) , i = I, 2, and g(l) are defined on the 
positive half axis and are continuous. We also fix the functions described in 
Proposition 5.1 and introduce the next assumption. 
Assumption 5.2. For i = 1, 2, the functions 
h;1(t) = g(t) / c;(t) 11f3 - I, 
h . - - {1 (2 -- f3)c;(t) }2 ( )/[ . -. - -)]1 //3- 1 di)- -- ( () ( )j g f C1(t)-j C2(t , 
C1 l + C2 I 
(36a) 
(36b) 
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t > 0, increase and tend to infinity as t tends to infinity, and the integral 
f '£' -A.th ( . i . fi . . o e ii t)i t is mte. 
Remark 5.2. Assumption 5.2 holds if g(t) [the consumer GDP] and 
the costs c;(t) grow exponentially, 
sand w are nonnegative, and 
O< K< A, 
where 
K= s··· (l / fJ··· l)w. 
(37) 
(38) 
(39) 
Note that g0 is the consumer GDP at time 0 and c? is the cost for transpor-
tation and extraction for player i at time 0. 
The theory described earlier for the general case is applicable for the 
model considered. Namely, the following is true. 
Proposition 5.2. Let Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2 hold. Then, Assump-
tions 2.1 and 2.2 hold. Moreover, the fast choice t j of player i, i = 1, 2, is 
the unique solution of the algebraic equation 
(40) 
the slow choice rt of player i is the unique solution of the algebraic equation 
(41) 
Thus, under Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2, the general algorithm for the 
resolution of the game of timing (see Section 4) is specified as follows. 
Step 1. Solve equations (40) and (41) for finding the players fast and 
slow choices ti and ti , respectively, i:::: I, 2. 
Step 2. Use equalities (14) and (15) for finding the players switch times 
i;, i = 1, 2. 
Step 3. Use Table 1 for identifying the Nash equilibria in the game of 
timing. 
As a specific example, let us consider the case described in Remark 5.2. Thus, 
in what follows , we assume that g(t) and c;(t) , i = 1, 2, arc given by (37) and 
inequality (38) is satisfied. Formulas (33) and (34) for bi! (t) and b;i(t) are 
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specified as 
where 
l/f=A-K, 
b?i = (l -{J)l //3-· lg° /(c~)1 //J- 1, 
b~2 = (2 - [3) 1!/3- I [l -(2- {3)c~ /(c~ + c~)fg° /(c~ + c~)l //J- I . 
Using the definition of the total benefit Bi (ti, t2) of player i [see (8) and 
(9)] and the expression (29) for the cost Ci(t,), we find an explicit formula for 
the total profit Pi(t 1, tJ [see (10)] of player i, which is determined by the 
player strategies t 1 and t2 . We have 
P2(t1,l2)= -pa-1e-J...'2xf j (I-e-P'2 t ·- I 
+ {b~I e -1/f lt I VI+ (b~2 - b~1)e• I/flt I v1, 
b~2e- "''2 I l/f, 
if t1 :5. l2, 
if l1 2:: !2, 
Figure 8 shows the Maple-simulated landscape of P1(ti. t2) for 
a= l.5, A= 0.3, O':::: 0.3, g°::: 3.5, X1 = 0.7, 
fJ = 0.5, (.o = <.o = 0 2 I ·2 · · 
(42) 
(43) 
Recall that, by Proposition 3.3, the critical points ii and i 1 needed for 
the identification of the type of the equilibria in the game of timing (see Table 
1) are found from the equalities 
P1(fj,i2)=P1(tt,i2) and P1(ii,t2)=P1U1,t;), 
respectively. In the situation considered now, the critical points are given 
explicitly. The next proposition is true. 
Proposition 5.3. For i = 1, 2, we have 
(44) 
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12 
0 
t, 3.8 
t, 3.4 
t, t, 
(a) (b) 
Fig. 8. Payoff landscape for player l: (a) for large 12, the fast choice (j' replies best; (a) for small 
12, the slow choice 17 replies best. 
where 
G _ a···I .. ;tr' -a ' ( l -pt•). a- 1 + bo ·- I/fr' I ; - -p e •x 11 -e ' ,.2e 1 ,vr 
+ pa-1 eJ.1; xf /( l - e·Pt;t-1 - b~1 e- vn; / l/f· (45) 
The next proposition specifies Proposition 5.2. 
Proposition 5.4. Let g(t) and c;(l), i = 1, 2, be given by (37) and let 
inequality (38) be satisfied. Then, for every player i, i = 1, 2, the following 
assertions hold. 
(a) The fast choicer; of player i is the unique solution of the algebraic 
equation 
l;w; = e•·1 (1 - e-prr /(A,+ ve-P'), 
where 
I;= pa - I / (1-/J)' i fi-lg°, 
w,. = xf (c~)' ifi- '. 
(46) 
(47) 
(48) 
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(b) The slow choice rt of player i is the unique solution of the alge-
braic equation 
l;z; = e'.1(1--- e--P1r /(:t +ve·P'), (49) 
where l; is defined by (47) and 
z; = xf(c~ + c~) 1 /P - 1 / (1 --(2 --· f3)c~ /(c~ + c~)]2. (50) 
Thus, under the assumptions of Remark 5.2, the suggested solution 
algorithm for the game of timing (Section 4) takes the following form. 
Step 1. 
Step 2. 
Step 3. 
Solve equations (46) and (49) for finding the players fast and 
slow choices r; and rt, respectively, i = 1, 2. 
Use formula (44) for finding the players switch times i;, i = 1, 2. 
Use Table I for identifying the Nash equilibria in the game of 
timing. 
Figure 9 shows the Maple-simulated graphs of the fast choice t'] and 
slow choice t7 of player 1 as functions of .x 1 and c? = c~ for different values of 
f3 and 
a= 1.5, :t = 0.3, cr = 0.3, g° = 3.5. 
6. Case Study 
In this section, we describe the game of timing in application to the 
Caspian and China gas markets. The values of the model parameters are 
0.1 0.1 0.1 
(a) (b) (c) 
Fig. 9. Graphs of the fast choice tj and slow choice ti of player I as functions of x 1 and c?: 
(a) /3 = 0.97; (b) /3 = 0. 75; (c) f3 = 0.5. 
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based on preliminary expert estimates. Our first case study deals with the 
competition of two major gas pipeline projects in the Caspian region, the 
Blue Stream Project of the Russian GAZPROM Company (project 1), which is 
aimed at delivering Russian gas to Turkey under the Black Sea; and the 
Trans-Caspian Project (project 2) directed from Turkmenistan underneath 
the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey. In this case 
study, the parameters of the model are chosen as follows: discount rate 
/t. = 0.1; obsolescence coefficient a= 0.3; delay coefficient, r= 0.65; inverse to 
the price elasticity of gas demand f3 = 0.55; initial level of the consumer GDP 
g° = 214.6; growth rate of the consumer GDP ;= 0.1; growth rate of the 
extraction costs w = 0.15; initial extraction costs c? = 67. 3, cg= 78.4; com-
mercialization levels of the accumulated investments .x 1 = 4.0, .x2 = 2.5. It is 
assumed that the projects start in 2001. 
For these parameters, there exist two Nash equilibria in the game of 
timing, the fast-slow equilibrium 
Ui, in= (2002.8, 2005.2) 
and the slow-fast equilibrium 
NPV 5 
$bin 
-5 
Ct7, r:;) = (2004.6, 2002.2) . 
Fig. IO. NPV dynamics for the fast-slow scenario of the gas pipeline competition in the 
Caspian region. 
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Figures l 0 and 11 depict the dynamics of the net present values NPV, 
P; = P;(t, t1,r2) (in billion dollars) 
{
- C;(t), 
P;(t,t1,t2)= C() Jib( I )d 
- -; t ; + 
11 
; r tj . r, 
if O~t<t;, 
if t;,:: l;, 
(51) 
with i,j = 1, 2, it:j, for project l (Blue Stream) and project 2 (Trans-Caspian) 
under the fast-slow Nash equilibrium investment scenario (t1i t2) =(ti, ti) 
and the slow-fast Nash equilibrium investment scenario (t 1, t2) =(ft, t2), 
respectively. The heavy line and the fine line show the NPV dynamics of Blue 
Stream and Trans-Caspian, respectively. 
Our second case study is related to the planned projects of gas pipelines 
from Russia to China. Two potential competitors on the North China gas 
market are the Kovikta-Zabaikalsk-Kharbin pipeline (project 1) stretched 
from the [rkutsk region to North China, and the Sakhalin-Khabarovsk-
Kharbin pipeline (project 2). The following values of the model parameters 
are chosen: 
NPV 4 
$ bin 
-5 
A.= 0.1, 
( = 0.0668, 
a= 0.3, r = o.58, 
OJ= 0.05, c~ = 57, 
f3 = 0.46, g° = 1157, 
c0 - 68 2 - ' .x, =6, .:?2 = 3 . 
Fig. 11. NPV dynamics for the slow-fast scenario of the gas pipeline competition in tbe 
Caspian region. 
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NPV 6 
$ bin 
-8 
Fig. 12. NPV dynamics for the Nash equilibrium scenario of the planned pipeline projects to 
the gas market in China. 
The initial year for the projects is set in 2001. 
In this case study, there exists a unique slow-fast Nash equilibrium 
(t;, t2) = (2003.6, 2002). 
Figure 12 shows the dynamics of the NPV (51), P; = P;(t, t 1, t2), i = 1, 2, for 
projects 1 and 2 under the slow-fast Nash equilibrium investment scenario 
(Ii. 12) = (t7, 12). The heavy line and the line line depict the NPV dynamics of 
the Kovikta-Zabaikalsk-Kharbin project and the Sakhalin-Khabarovsk-
Kharbin project, respectively. 
The results demonstrated on Figs. I 0-12 have been calculated using the 
G-TIME software package elaborated and tested by 0 . J. Nikonov and Y. V. 
Minoullin . 
7. Appendix: Proof of the Main Results 
Here, we prove Propositions 5.1 to 5.4. 
Proof of Proposition 5.1. 
Step 1. Formula (29) was obtained in Ref. 14. 
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Step 2. The differentiation of (29) gives 
,, - a- I -A[).1'x f (I-e-p1, t - l - e-A.1,.Xf(a - l)(l - e-p1, )a-2pe-pt; 
c i (ti) - p ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(1 _ e- pt; )20:- 2 
po:-1 c''' x~ (1 - e- p1, r'- 2 
= ' ·' [ --- 1!.(1 --- e p1,) -· (a .... 1 )pe·pt,] (1 - e p1,)20: • 
e-- At; 
= -pa-1_xa---- - [?c(1-e-p1, ) +(a- l)pe-p1,] 
' (1 - e·Pti)a 
- At; -a 
=-pa- I -:_: ___ :~L---[I!.+ (p(a - l) - 1!.)e-P11] ( I - e--P11)a 
- a - 1 e-J,1,x f (?• +ve-p1,) 
- - p ---------------------( 1 _ e ·pt, )a 
For the last transformation, we have used the equality 
p(a - 1)-1!.=aa 
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(52) 
following from (30) and the notation (32). For a;(t;) = - C/(t;) [see (1)], we 
have (31). 
Step 3. Assume that player i occupies the market solely. Then, the price 
is given by 
;r(ylt) = (g(t)/y;)fi, 
and the payoff p;(yi,y2 jt) to player i equals 
p;(y;il) = e ).'li;(t}'l_v; ·/i ... C;(l)y;). (53) 
The supply game is reduced to an optimization problem, and bn(t) is found 
as the maximum of p; (y;lt) over all positive J';- Since p; (y1lt) is strictly concave 
in y 1, its maximum is reached at the unique point y;(t) >Osuch that 
dp;( y;(t) it) j dy; = e·,ttg(tJ'8[(1 -- {3)y/(l) -- C;(t)] = 0. 
Hence, 
y;(t) = [g(t) / c;(t) 1i 11 ](1 ---{3) 11/3. 
Recall that 
b;1(t) = p;(y,(t)lc) 
and substitute y 1 = y1(t) into (53). We get 
bil (t) = e ·).t[gf1(t)/l - C;(t)]y;(t) 
= e· ;.1[ c1( t) / (I --- /3) --- c;(t)][g(t) / c;(t) 1 //3](1 --- /3) 1 /fJ, 
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and finally, 
b;1(t) = e·J.1fJ(l -- fJ)1 /fl- 1g(t)/c;1fJ -- l(t); 
i.e ., (33) holds. 
Step 4. Now, let Assumption 5.1 hold and let both players operate on 
the market. Then, 
and for the payoff to player i, we have 
(54) 
Let us show that the instantaneous supply game has a unique Nash equili-
brium under Assumption 5.1. 
Since p;(.v1,y21t), i= 1, 2, is strictly concave in y;, a point (yi,y2) is a 
Nash equilibrium if and only if 
(55) 
or explicitly, 
(56) 
Here, as above, 
y=y1 + Y2· 
For the sum of the left-hand sides for i = 1, 2, we have 
Hence, 
and 
(57) 
Rewriting (56) as 
j3gf3(t)y; = g1\t)y - C;(l)yfl+I 
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and using (57), we get 
Y; = [y I pgP(t)][g,6(1) ... C;(t)y,6] 
= [yj (3gfl(t))(gfi(t) --· {(2 --· {3)c;(t)/(c1 (t) + C2(t)]}gf3(t)) 
= { (2 - /3)gfi( t) /[c1 (t) + c2(t)J} 1 /fJ (I //3){ I - (2 - f3)c,.(t) /[c1 (t) + c2(t)]} 
= [(2 -- /3)' //3 //3]{1--(2 --- /3)c;(t)/[c1(t) + c2(t)]}g(t)/[c1(t) + c2(t)]' i fi_ (58) 
The latter is necessary for (Yi.Yi) to be a Nash equilibrium in the supply 
game. Hence, if the Nash equilibrium exists, it is unique. Point (_vi, y2) given 
by (58) has positive components due to Assumption 5.1; See (28) . Moreover, 
(y 1,y2) satisfies (56), where y = y 1 +Yi, which is equivalent to (55). Hence, 
(y 1,y2) is the Nash equilibrium. We have stated that a unique Nash equili-
brium exists. Denote it (y1(t),y2(t)). By (58), we get 
By definition, 
Substituting y,. = y;(t), i = I, 2, into (54) and noticing that 
is given by (57), we get 
b,.2(t) = e ·.l.t [ g:~) --- c;(t)] Y;(t) 
= e-.l.1{[c1(t) + ci(t)]/(2-,B)-c,.(t)}y,.(t) 
::: e-.l.1 {[c' (l~ + ci(t)]} (1 - (2 - /3)c;(t)) [(2- /3)' 1f3 / fi] x 
("'-/3) c1(t) + c2(t) 
{] -(2- ,8)c;(t)/[c1 (t) + C2(t)]} g(t) l / {J, 
(c1 (t) + C2(t)] 
and finally, 
Formula (34) is proved. 
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Step 5. By definition, we have 
b;i(t) = p;(Y1(t),y2(t)jt) 
= e-J.r[n'(t, Yi (t) + Y2(t)) - c;(t)]y;(t) 
= {g(t)/[y1(t) + yi(t)]}Py;(t)-c;(t)y;(I) 
< [g(t)/y;(t)l° y,(t)- C;(l)}';(t) 
:s sup {[g(t)/y;]Py; -c;(t)y;} 
y,>O . 
= b;1 (t). 
Inequality (35) is stated. Proposition 5.1 is proved. 0 
Proof of Proposition 5.2. Let us check Assumption 2.1. The function 
C;(l;) [see (29)) is continuously differentiable. The expression (52) for C/(t) 
shows that C!(l) < 0. Hence, C; (t) is monotonically decreasing. Consider the 
ratio in the right-hand side. The numerator e- Ar'x; decreases in t; and the 
denominator (1 --- e-P' 1)'~ increases in l;. Hence, the ratio decreases in f;. Since 
the square bracket decreases in l;, its product with the ratio decreases in !; . 
As a result, we conclude that C;'(t;) increases in f; . We have shown that 
Assumption 2.1 is satisfied. 
Let us turn to Assumption 2.2. For the rate of cost reduction, we have 
the expression (31) whose denominator tends to 0 when t approaches 0. 
Hence, a;(l) tends to infinity as t approaches 0. Therefore, for all t > 0 suffi-
ciently small, we have 
a;(t) > bil ( t) > bdt). 
The expression for a; (t) and b;2(t) [see (34)] show that 
bi2(t) / a;(I) = h0(t)h;2(t), 
where ho.(t) is given in (36) and h0(t) is such that, for some r>O and e >O, the 
lower bound inf,.,,,,h0(t) > e holds. By Assumption 5.2, h(t) tends to infinity as 
t tends to infinity. Therefore, for all t sufficiently large, we have 
b;1 (t) > b,2(t) > a;(t) . 
Since the functions a; (t), bil (t), bi2(t) are continuous, there exist a r; > 0 that 
solves the equation 
and a t7 > 0 that solves the equation 
a;(t) = bn(t). 
(59) 
(60) 
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In order to state that Assumption 2.2 holds, it is now sufficient to show that 
r; and rt are unique. We specify equation (59) by substituting the expressions 
for a;(r) and bn(r); see (31) and (33) . We get 
pa-1 xf e--'r (A+ v.xf e-Pt)/(1 - e-pr)a = e--<r (1 - /3)1 /{3-1 g(t)/ ci /fJ··I (t). 
Cancelling e- AI and using the definition of h;1(t) [see (36)], we arrive at 
equation (40). The right-hand side of (40) strictly increases in r due to 
Assumption 5.2. Hence, equation (59) has the unique root ti. 
For equation (60), we argue similarly. Specify (60) by substituting the 
expression for a;(r) and bn(t); see (31) and (34). We get 
pa--1,xfe·l.r(A. + ve··pt)/(1--- e··P')a 
= e- i.r (2 - ,8) 11 fJ -- I { 1 - (2 - ,B)c;(t) /[c 1 (t) + c2(t)J} 2 g( t) /[c1 (t) + c2(l)] 1ifJ -I. 
Using the definition of hdt) [see (36)], we arrive at equation (41) . The right-
hand side of ( 41) strictly increases in t due to Assumption 5.2. Hence, equa-
tion (60) has the unique root rt. 
Proposition 5.2 is proved. D 
Proof of Proposition 5.3. Let i = 1 (for i = 2, the argument is similar). 
Using formula (42) for P1(t 1, r2) and taking into account that i2 lies 
between r; and rt (see Proposition 3.3), we specify the equality 
into 
P 1(fj, i2)=P1(t7, i2) 
- pa-I e.J.tj .xf / (1 ... e·P'1)a-1 + b~1 e·Vllj /'I' + (b~2 .. b~ I )e- 'I' i' /'I' 
= -- pa--1 e· -~tT .xf /(1 -·· e ·Pl~)a- 1 + b~2e·'lftT /'I'. 
Resolving with respect to i~, we get 
or 
where 
(b'f 2 - b~1 )e- 'lli2 /'I'= - pa- I e--<17 .xf /(1 - e-P'T)a-- 1 + bi12e- 'l''T /'I' 
+pa- I e--<r; xa/(1 - e-pr;)a .. I - bo e- 'llri I llf 
· I II ''!'• 
G, = - pa- I e-,\1; xf /(1- e-PIT)a-1 
+ b~2e-'f'T I 'I'+ pa-1 e-?.1; .xf /(1 - e-pr;r-1 - b~1 e- '11'1 I 'I'· 
The representation ( 44), (45) is stated. D 
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Proof of Proposition 5.4. 
Step 1. Due to the form of g(t) and c;(t) [sec (37)], equation (40), which 
determines the fast choice r; of player i, is specified as 
pa-1 xf /( 1 _ /3)1 /{1 -1 = [( 1 _ e-Pt)a / (A.+ ve-P')]g° ek' /(c~) 1;p .. 1, 
or 
a .. I -a( ,O)l //J-1/ (1 {J)l /P-1 o _ 1<1(1 -p1)a / (, + ··pl) p X ; c; .... g - e . ·-- e , I\, ve . 
Using the notations (47) and (48), we arrive at equation (46). 
Step 2. Due to (37), equation (41) determining t/" is specified as 
pa-1.x f / (1-(3)1 /p .. 1 
= [(l - e--P' )a / (/!. + ve··P')][l - (2- {J)c~' / (c~ + c~)]2g0 e"' / (c? + c~)l /fi- I . 
Using the notations ( 47) and (50), we arrive at equation ( 49). 0 
8. Conclusions 
The paper is devoted to the analysis of a two-player game, in which the 
players strategies are the times of terminating the individual dynamical 
processes. The formal setting is related to the management of large-scale 
innovation projects, whose key feature is that the profits gained through the 
implementation of the projects are highly sensitive to the projects commer-
cialization times. The basic reason for that is that the price formation 
mechanism changes rapidly the price as a new project is commercialized and 
the supply sharply increases. This situation is analyzed in the context of the 
competition of two projects on the construction of gas pipelines. In the game 
between the projects, the total profits gained during the pipelines life periods 
act as payoffs and the commercialization times as strategies. The reduction 
of project management to choices of the commercialization times is justified 
by the assumption that the individual regulation mechanisms, comprising 
investments into the construction of the gas pipelines and regulation of 
supply, work optimally provided the commercialization times are given . The 
analysis of the game leads to the restriction of the player rational choices to 
no more than two prescribed combinations of commercialization times, 
which constitute the Nash equilibria in the game. Typically, two Nash 
equilibria arise and the projects compete for a fast commercialization sce-
nario; its complement, a slow commercialization scenario, is less profitable, 
representing the best response to the fast scenario of the competitor. A sim-
ple algorithm for finding the Nash equilibria is described. 
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